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MCCRAY V. ILLINOIS: PROBABLE CAUSE
AND THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE
By

S

JOSEPH

R. QUINN*

In recent years, no area of the law has been the subject of so
many court opinions or has engendered more public controversy than
has the law of criminal procedure. In this decade alone, the many
decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the
Constitutional rights of the criminally accused has wreaked havoc
among defense attorneys, prosecutors, lower court judges, law school
professors and text writers, and the public. The arena of criminal
procedure is caught up in the pangs of rapid transition and has
been the subject of innumerable legal articles in scholarly journals.
Mr. Quinn, of the Denver Public Defender's office, devotes his
attention in this article to one particulararea of criminal procedure
the acquisition of evidence by police officers from a search and
seizure based on the tip from an undisclosed informer. The recent
Supreme Court decision of McCray v. Illinois dealt with this area,
and the author is critical of the decision. After considering the
historical use of the informer in law enforcement, the author considers in depth the dual problems of when an informer's tip can
constitute probable cause for a search and seizure and when the
identity of the informer should be disclosed to the accused in connection with a pre-trial motion to suppress the seized evidence.

INCE the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Weeks
v. United States,' the law of search and seizure has assumed
significant dimensions in the administration of criminal justice.
Weeks held that the fourth amendment barred the use in federal
courts of evidence secured through an unconstitutional search and
seizure. In Mapp v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court made applicable to
the states under the fourteenth amendment the exclusionary rule
of Weeks. As a result of Mapp, intricate problems of evidentiary
acquisition by law enforcement officials have become critical in
every jurisdiction of the United States. In order to implement the
exclusionary rule first enunciated in Weeks, rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was enacted; it has since been
adopted by several states, including Colorado. 3 Federal rule 41(e)
affords a party aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure the
right to move the court for an order suppressing for use as evidence
anything so obtained on the ground that "(1) the property was
illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient
*Assistant Public Defender, Denver, Colorado; A.B., St. Peter's College (1957) ; LL.B.,
Rutgers Law School (1961).
1232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 COLO. R. CRIm. P. 41 (e).
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on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the
warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for believing the
existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5)
the warrant was illegally executed."'
This article will focus on one area of evidentiary acquisition
by law enforcement officials: a search and seizure based on a tip
from an undisclosed informer. 5 Generally, the term "informer"
refers to anyone who, unknown to the alleged offender, communicates to law enforcement officials information concerning criminal
activity on the part of another.' In practical application, particularly
within the area of search and seizure, an informer is someone who
furnishes the police with information or a "tip" concerning another's
criminal acts, which tip serves as an ostensible reason to arrest and
search the person or premises of the alleged offender, while the informer's identity remains unknown to the person arrested. The term
can also include those who, having participated in some criminal
offense and having been apprehended, disclose information of
another's criminal activity to the police under a promise of immunity
from prosecution or reduction of the criminal charges, the identity of
the informer once again being unknown to the one whose criminal
conduct is reported.
The initial question in the informer-search and seizure area is
whether a tip from an undisclosed informer constitutes probable
cause. Of equal significance is the question whether, and under what
circumstances, the identity of the informer should be disclosed to
the one aggrieved by the search.
The problem of balancing the public interest in effective law
enforcement with the often competing constitutional right to be
secure against an unreasonable search and seizure is no more apparent
than in the case of a search based on an informer's tip to the police;
the prosecution in such a case will universally claim the informer
privilege, that is, the evidentiary privilege of withholding the informer's identity upon a demand for disclosure by the defendant.
While the effect of the privilege is to protect the informer's identity,
4 FED. R. CRIM. P.

4

1 (e). See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACE,
ff 41.02 (1966).
5 For an excellent and detailed analysis of the entire search and seizure area, although
principally examining Illinois law, see LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of
True Law ... has not... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 255.
6 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For an emperical study
as to the nature of informants, see Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial
and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 '(1953).
7 Donnelly, judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1092 (1951).
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it is not the informer, but rather the government or prosecution
which has the privilege and the legal standing to claim it.8
Several federal and state courts have addressed themselves to
the problem of the informer privilege in search and seizure situations,9 and the decisions have ranged in approach from unqualified
dismissal of the criminal charge in the absence of disclosure of the
informer's identity'0 to the sustainment of the privilege, even at the
expense of depriving the defendant of the only effective device
of protecting his fourth amendment rights." Without the benefit
of a conclusive constitutional mandate from the Supreme Court, the
thrust of recent judicial opinion in state and lower federal courts
has been noticeably in the direction of abrogating the privilege in
the interest of affording the defendant fundamental fairness in litigating his constitutional right to be secure against an unreasonable
2
search and seizure.'
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States in McCray v.
Illinois'3 considered the issue of whether probable cause existed in
a warrantless arrest and search and seizure, predicated primarily on
an informer's tip which was partially corroborated by police observation of, and previous acquaintance with, the defendant, and the
further issue of whether the sixth and fourteenth amendments necessitated a total abandonment of the informer privilege. By a 5-4
decision the court held: (1) there was probable cause for the arrest,
search, and seizure of McCray; and (2) McCray's challenge to the
informer privilege did not pose a constitutional issue, the problem
8 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Roviaro v. United

States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir.
1932).
9
E.g., United States v. Robinson, 325 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Lane v. United States,
321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99 (9th Cir.
1962); United States ex rel. DeNegris v. Menser, 247 F. Supp. 826 (D. Conn.
1965); United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp. 543 '(S.D.N.Y. 1964);
People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934 (1965) ; People v. McShann, 50 Cal.
2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1958) ; Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d
39 (1958) ; People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 2d 728, 341 P.2d 54 (1959) ; Drouin
v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960) ; State v. Oliver, 92 N.J. Super. 228, 222
A.2d 761 (1966). See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 257 (1961).
10In Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958), the California
Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition, preventing defendant's trial.
'1 Commonwealth v. Carter, 208 Pa. Super. 245, 222 A.2d 475 (1966), and 71 DICK.
L. REV. 366 (1967), which criticizes the Carter decision. See cases cited in 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 n.10 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
12 Cases cited note 9 supra. But cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, 208 Pa. Super. 245, 222
A.2d 475 (1966). See 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1967).
13 386 U.S. 300 (1967). For case comments on McCray v. Illinois, see 32 ALBANY L.
REV. 218 (1967); 1967 DUKE L.J. 888; 36 U. CN. L. REV. 746 (1967); 7 WASHBURN L.J. 115 (1967) ; 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 270 (1967). See The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 112, 196 (1967).
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instead being primarily of evidentiary, as opposed to constitutional,
4
dimensions and, therefore, a proper subject of state control.1
This article will trace the development of the informer privilege
prior to McCray, and then analyze McCray and the dual problems
of probable cause and disclosure of an informer's identity upon
demand by the accused in connection with a motion to suppress.
I.

THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE

Over the centuries law enforcement officials have depended
on informers to furnish them with information of criminal activities.
In medieval England, a procedure called "approvement" developed,
by which a person arraigned for treason or another felony would
confess his guilt and then offer to inform and convict other criminals
in exchange for a pardon; if they were convicted he was pardoned,
if not, he was hanged. 5 During the 16th and 17th centuries, statutes
were passed creating what has been called the "informer suit,"
whereby any member of the public had the right to sue for, and
retain a part of, the fine imposed for statutory violations. 6 Motivated
by personal profit, persons made false accusations to such an extent that Coke characterized the informer as a "viperous vermin,
which endeavoured to have eaten out the sides of the church and
common-wealth.''17 Even today, vestiges of the "informer suit" remain with us in the form of statutes which award the informer a
share of the fine. 8
The law has long accorded privileged status to the identity of
persons supplying law enforcement officials with information concerning the commission of criminal offenses. 9 The theoretical pur14The

Court in McCray also stated that it had not laid down any hard and fast evidentiary rules to guide the federal courts in this area of disclosure and would not do so.
The ambivalent and case-by-case approach of the Supreme Court in this area readily
explains the wide ranging opinions by lower federal and state courts when confronted
with informer-search and seizure cases.
15 Donnelly, supra note 7, at 1091.
16 Id.
17E. COKE,THIRD INSTITUTE *194.

18Various federal statutes provide for compensation to informers providing information
relating to criminal offenses. They range over a broad area, including but not limited
to the following: contraband articles, 49 U.S.C. § 784 (1964); cotton futures, 26
U.S.C. § 7263 (1964) ; custom law violations, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1619, 1620

(1964);

vessels engaging in slave trade, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1351, 1353 '(1964) ; Indian liquor traffic
violations, 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1964) ; Indian law violations, 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1964) ;
narcotic drug violations, 21 U.S.C. 8§ 183, 199 (1964) ; postal law violations, 39
U.S.C. § 2407 (1964) ; export of war materials, 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) ; presiden-

tial assassination, kidnap or assault, 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (Supp. II, 1967).
19 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§

2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Rex v. Akers, (1790),

as cited in footnote in King v. Howe, 6 Esp. 124, 125-26, 170 Eng. Rep. 849, 850
(N.P. 1808). For an annotation collecting the federal cases on the government's
privilege of nondisclosure, see Annot., 1 L. Ed. 2d 1998 (1957). See generally
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 257 (1961).
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pose of the informer privilege is to spur the public interest in
effective law enforcement by protecting the personal welfare and
preserving the anonymity of the informer, thus encouraging him to
20
communicate his knowledge of criminal violations.
So frequent is the use of informer's tips by law enforcement
officials as justification for an arrest and search that one Supreme
Court Justice has characterized the times as "an age where faceless
informers have been reintroduced in our society in alarming ways."2 1
Thus far, there remains a prevailing judicial adherence to the value
judgment that "the informer is a vital part of society's defensive
arsenal.'"' Even courts which strongly urge the preservation of the
informer privilege have, however, imposed various limitations on
that privilege. Thus the privilege applies only to communications
made to law enforcement officials who have the responsibility of
investigating crime.2 ' And the privilege protects only the identity
24
of the informer; the content of the communication is not privileged.
20

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Worthington v. Scribner, 109
Mass. 487, 488-89 (1872) ; State v. Hall, 189 Wash. 174, 178, 64 P.2d 83, 85 (1957).
See 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 270, 279-80 (1967). For an example of the premise that
there exists a very real danger of personal retaliation in informer cases, see Schuster
v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958), relating the notorious
case of Arnold Schuster who was murdered after informing on bankrobber Willie
Sutton. See Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative
Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206, 207-08 (1953).
In THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

21
22

ON

LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE

(1967), the Commission, in detailing the difficulties in obtaining proof in combating
organized crime, states at 198:
IT~he true victims of organized crime, such as those succumbing to extortion, are too afraid to inform law enforcement officials. Some misguided
citizens think there is social stigma in the role of "informer", and this tends
to prevent reporting and cooperating with police.
Law enforcement may be able to develop informants, but organized
crime uses torture and murder to destroy the particular prosecution at hand
and to deter others from cooperating with police agencies. Informants who
do furnish intelligence to the police often wish to remain anonymous and
are unwilling to testify publicly.
Concerns other than anonymity often affect the informant's motives in telling his
tale to the police. This is particularly true in the area of narcotic violations and drug
abuse. As stated by the Commission, at 218:
The use of informants to obtain leads ... is also standard and essential. An
informer may or may not be a person facing criminal charges. If he is not,
he may supply information out of motives of revenge or monetary reward.
More typically the informant is under charges and is induced to give information in return for a "break" in the criminal process such as a reduction
of those charges. Frequently he will make it a condition of cooperation that
his identity remain confidential.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 273 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).

State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39, 44 (1964), as quoted in McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 306-08 (1967).
23 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §-2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
24
1d. See Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Henrik Mannerfrid Inc. v.
Teegarden, 23 F.R.D. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Nola Elec. v. Reilly, 11 F.R.D. 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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The informer privilege has come under most serious scrutiny
in cases involving the fourth amendment." The questions posed
are usually the two mentioned before: (1) whether and under
what circumstances an informer's tip constitutes probable cause for
an arrest, search, and seizure; and (2) whether and under what
circumstances the defendant has a right to know the identity of the
informer. The genesis of judicial concern over the informer privilege
largely stems from Roviaro v. United States." In Roviaro the anonymous informer was potentially a material witness on the issue of
guilt, rather than the source of information leading to the search
and seizure. Roviaro had purchased narcotics from the informer who
was riding in Roviaro's vehicle, while a government agent, riding in
the trunk of the vehicle, overheard conversation between the informer
and Roviaro concerning the sale. Both before and at the trial the
defendant requested the name of the informer on the ground that
he might be able to give relevant and exculpatory evidence. The
motion for disclosure was denied, and Roviaro was convicted. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction and in
the course of its opinion limited the proper invocation of the
privilege as follows:
A .. .limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises
from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give
way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if
the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action.2 7
In dictum the Court in Roviaro discussed the informer privilege
as it related to the issue of probable cause. Recognizing that probable
cause and informer privilege are practically inseparable issues, the
Court stated that in informer cases "the Government has been
required to disclose the identity of the informant unless there was
' 28
sufficient evidence apart from his communication.
Subsequent to Roviaro, several courts have required the disclosure of the informer's identity when a warrantless search and
2 U.S. CONSr. amend. IV, provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
2
6 353 US.53 (1957).
27 Id. at

60-61.
28 Id. at 61.
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seizure were predicated on an informer's tip.2" Relying on Roviaro's
dictum, Mr. Justice Traynor in Priestly v. Superior Court"° held that
if communications from an informer are necessary to establish probable cause, then disclosure should be compelled in order to give the
defendant a fair opportunity to rebut the testimony of the officer
concerning the informer's tip. Otherwise, the arresting officer would
become the sole judge of the existence of probable cause to make
the search.
It was in the context of the growing judicial reluctance to
sanction the privilege that the McCray decision arose. To glean the
significance of McCray, a detailed analysis of the opinion is in order.
II.

THE MCCRAY CASE AND
PROBABLE CAUSE

A. McCray v. Illinois
On January 16, 1964, at about seven o'clock in the morning,
George McCray was arrested without warrant for possession of
narcotics near the intersection of 49th Street and Calumet Avenue
in Chicago, Illinois. The arresting officers found a package on
McCray containing heroin, and he was indicted for its unlawful
possession. Before trial he filed a motion to suppress, claiming that
the police had acquired the heroin in an unconstitutional search and
seizure. At the suppression hearing McCray testified that until about
one-half hour before his arrest he had been at a friend's house, that
after leaving, he had walked with a lady to 48th Street and South
29

E.g., Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1962) ("The 'privilege'
must give way when a challenge of the informant is essential to the proper disposition
of the case. The determination of the validity of an arrest, search and seizure is
essential to such a disposition.") ; United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp.
543, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ("Upon a review of the entire record the Court concludes
that the informer's identity was necessary to resist the State's evidence on the issue
of probable cause, and that without it he was denied the only effective and available
means of rebutting Gilhofer's testimony, and consequently deprived of a fundamentally fair trial.") ; People v. Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 2d 728, 341 P.2d 54 (1959);
Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85, 92-93 (1960).
Even prior to Roviaro, courts have compelled disclosure when essential to the
issue of the validity of an arrest, search, and seizure without warrant. United States
v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629 (D. Wyo. 1930) (-[T]he only safe rule to adopt will be
to require officers who presume to make search and seizures . ..without warrant,
to disclose every element which goes to make up their case of probable cause, and
that this rule reasonably includes the source of their information ....
") ; Wilson v.
United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) ; United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1937); Smith v. State, 169 Tenn. 633, 90 S.W.2d 523 (1936).
Various courts have recognized the rule of disclosure but did not require it in
the particular case. E.g., Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963)
United States v. One 1957 Ford Custom Tudor, 264 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959)
McQuaid v. United States, 198 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Cannon v. United States,
158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946); Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir.
1931) ; People v. McMurray, 171 Cal. App. 2d 178, 340 P.2d 335 (1959) ; Ferrara
v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958) ; People v. Mack, 12 111. 2d 151, 145 N.E.2d
609 (1957) ; Brewster v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1955) ; Arredondo
v. State, 324 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959).
30 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
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Park, and that as he approached 49th Street and Calumet Avenue,
an officer stopped him in an alley. McCray further testified that the
officer did not show him a warrant but rather proceeded to search
his person and seize the narcotics.
One of the arresting officers, Jackson, testified that on the
morning of the arrest he and two fellow officers had a conversation
with an informer in their unmarked police car. Jackson had been
acquainted with the informer during the past year, and during this
period the informer had supplied him with information about
narcotics activities on at least 15 or 16 occasions; the information
was accurate and resulted in numerous arrests and convictions. Jackson furnished to the court the names of persons convicted of narcotics violations as the result of the informer's previous tips.
Jackson testified that on the morning of McCray's arrest the
informer told him that McCray "was selling narcotics and had
narcotics on his person and that he could be found in the vicinity
of 47th and Calumet at this particular time."3 1 Officer Jackson, who
was acquainted with McCray, drove with the informer and other
police officers to the vicinity of 47th and Calumet. The informer
observed McCray, pointed him out to the police, and then left on foot.
Officer Jackson testified that McCray was seen "walking with a
woman, then separating from her and meeting briefly with a man,
then proceeding alone, and finally, after seeing the police car,
'hurriedly walk[ingl between two buildings.' "32 Thereupon Jackson and his partners left their patrol car, accosted McCray, and
informed him that he was under arrest.
Arresting Officer Arnold also testified at the suppression hearing, and gave substantially the same account of the circumstances
of McCray's arrest and search. Arnold testified that he had known
the informer for approximately two years and that, during that time,
the informer had given him information concerning narcotics violations about 20 or 25 times, and that the tips had resulted in convictions.
Officers Jackson and Arnold were asked on cross-examination
by McCray's counsel to reveal the name and address of the informer.
The immediate objection by the prosecution on grounds of privilege
was sustained by the trial court. The motion to supress was denied,
McCray was ultimately convicted, and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed. 33 On certiorari to the Supreme Court 4 the judgment was
affirmed, the Court holding (1) that there was probable cause to
31 McCray

v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 302 (1967).

32 Id.
33 People v. McCray, 33 I1. 2d 66, 210 N.E.2d 161 (1965).

34

384 U.S. 949 (1966).
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sustain the arrest and incidental search and seizure, and (2) that
neither the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment nor the
sixth amendment rights of confrontation and cross-examination
were violated by Illinois' recognition of the informer privilege on
these facts.
B. Informer-ProbableCause
To establish probable cause for a search and seizure, more is
demanded than common rumor or report, suspicion, or even strong
reason to suspect.3 5 Probable cause is based on probabilities - "the
factual and practical considerations of every day life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."3 6 In other
words, are "' the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers']
knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed" ?37 The factors constituting probable cause are no different
in the case of a warrantless search than in the case of a search pursuant to warrant.38 Thus, whether probable cause can be predicated
on an informer's tip depends primarily on whether the tip is "reasonably trustworthy." The trustworthiness of the tip will depend on
such factors as (1) the proven reliability of the informer, i.e., the
consistency with which prior disclosures led to successful arrests
and productive searches; (2) the timeliness of the information conveyed;39 (3) the apparent basis of the informer's knowledge whether personal knowledge ("I saw") or hearsay knowledge ("I
heard") ; (4) the factual content of the communication itself; and
(5) the corroboration, if any, of the content of the informer's tip
40
by independent observation or knowledge.
The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas4" indicated what was
needed for an informer's tip to constitute probable cause. Aguilar,
35Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160 (1949) ; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949), modifying Grau v. United
States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932), which had indicated that only evidence competent in a
jury trial may be adduced to show probable cause.
3 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
38
E.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). This is not to say that the search
will be considered valid so long as probable cause exists, regardless of the existence
of a warrant. The Supreme Court strongly prefers searches under a warrant, and a
doubtful or marginal case of probable cause may be sustained under a warrant where
without one the search might be considered unlawful. Ventresca v. United States, 380
U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965) ; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
39 For an excellent collection of cases dealing with the sufficiency of a showing as to
the time of occurrence of the facts relied upon to support an affidavit for a search
warrant, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 525 (1965).
40 See generally Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the
Federal Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1965).
41378 U.S. 108 (1964).
36
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a case involving a search pursuant to a warrant, held that the underlying facts and circumstances of the informer's tip must be affirmatively set forth in the police officer's affidavit; mere conclusions
are insufficient. More specifically, Aguilar held that there must
be a showing not only of the factual circumstances which led the
officer to believe the informer (such as informer reliability) but
also of the factual circumstances which demonstrate that the informer really knew those things which he told the police (credibility
of information) 42
Informer reliability is predicated on the accuracy of information
given by the informer to law enforcement officials on prior occasions;4" the mere testimonial characterization of the informer as
previously reliable is, of course, a conclusion and therefore improper.44 Prior reliability should be established factually. Thus, the
fact that an informer has previously given information which merely
resulted in arrests would not ipso facto establish his reliability, since
the subsequent arrests might not have been for the reason initially
indicated by the informer, and might not necessarily have resulted
in the discovery of the anticipated contraband.4 5 Where, however,
it is established that the informer on two separate occasions in the
past gave information "regarding the possession of marijuana by
various persons," and "on each of these occasions said information
proved to be correct and resulted in two arrests for possesion of
4 See Ventresca v. United States, 308 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). Precisely how much
factual information of the underlying circumstances is needed to obtain a warrant
pursuant to affidavit varies, depending upon the type of offense. For example, a few
simple facts would logically establish probable cause in a possession of narcotics
case, but much more will be required in a tax fraud case. Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214 (1965). See LaFave, supra note 5, at 262-66.
4
Sin People v. McClellan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97, 98 (1966), the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that the mere fact of police officers' acting on tips received
from an informer does not establish previous reliability. The accuracy of the tips
must be affirmatively shown:
The fact that the officers made three arrests based on information furnished
by Slick shows only that they acted on his previous tips and does not show
that the previous tips proved to be accurate. While it might be inferred that
the officers would not continually act on Slick's tips if they proved to be
unreliable nevertheless, we feel the informer's past reliability should not be
left to inference, when it is such an easy matter to show the accuracy of the
previous tips. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the People must
show that the previous tips from an informer resulted in convictions, as the
defendant contends; but it is sufficient, at this time, to hold that the fact
that the police acted upon previous information of an informer does not
prove that the prior information was accurate and the informer reliable.
There is apparently no minimum requirement as to the number of previous tips
received; one previous tip may be sufficient to establish prior reliability under proper
circumstances. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 at 268 n. 2 (1960).
44People v. West, 237 Cal. App. 2d 801, 47 Cal. Rptr. 341 (1965) ; People v. McClellan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97 (1966). But cf. United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d
595 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962), where the court rested its finding of probable cause entirely on information received by an FBI agent which, the
affidavit simply averred, he "[believed] to be reliable."
45
People v. McClellan, 34 Ill.
2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97 (1966) ; see also United States
v. Perry, 380 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1967).
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marijuana," and "said informant has never given . . . any information that proved to be incorrect," the informer's previous reliability
is sufficiently established."
Credibility of information involves a focus upon the timeliness,
knowledgeable basis, and content of the communication from the
informer. In the absence of a firm basis in timely, personally known
facts, the informer's tip is insufficient to constitute probable cause;
for in such case the court would be at a loss to know whether the
informer spoke from recent personal knowledge or "was merely
peddling secondhand gossip overheard in a barroom. ""' Thus, in
Aguilar v. Texas,4" the Supreme Court held a search warrant invalid
on the ground that the affidavit only stated a conclusion by an unknown informant and there was no proof that either the affiant
or the affiant's unidentified source spoke with personal knowledge.
Consequently, "the magistrate here certainly could not 'judge for
himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on . . . to show probable
cause.

''"49

The question of whether informer-hearsay must be corroborated,
at least in part, by personal observations of the police in order to
46 People v. West, 237 Cal. App. 2d 801, 47 Cal. Rptr. 341, 343-44 n.1 (1965). How-

ever, probable cause was found wanting in West because the informer's source of
knowledge was not sufficiently established in the affidavit. See United States v.
Suarez, 380 F.2d 713 '(2d Cir. 1967).
47 People v. West, 237 Cal. App. 2d 801, 47 Cal. Rptr. 341, 345 (1965).
48 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Supreme Court dealt with the problem of the knowledgeable basis of the informer in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933),
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), and Aguilar. All three cases
involved warrants, but the statements of the Court in holding the affidavits insufficient are equally applicable to warrantless searches. In the Aguilar case, Houston
police officers obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit which recited that
'[alffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe
that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates, and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia
are being kept at the above described premises .... " In holding the affidavit insufficient to constitute probable cause, the Court stated:
The vice in the present affidavit is at least as great as in Nathanson and
Giordenello. Here the "mere conclusion" that petitioner possessed narcotics
was not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified
informant. The affidavit here not only "contains no affirmative allegation
that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained
therein," it does not even contain an "affirmative allegation" that the
affiant's unidentified source "spoke with personal knowledge." For all that
appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there
were narcotics in petitioner's possession.
378 U.S. at 113-14.
In United States v. Mesner, 247 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D. Conn. 1965), the court
commented on an affidavit as follows:
The affidavit here is fundamentally no more than the bare statement that
the police received information from a reliable source that pool selling was
being carried on at petitioner's premises. It nowhere discloses how the
informant came to his stated conclusion. On what facts was it based? Did
he actually see the pool selling being carried on or the "paraphernalia"?
Did he hear it from another unmentioned source, or is his statement based
on mere suspicion?
49 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
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constitute probable cause has never been expressly decided by the
Supreme Court. In upholding the legality of searches in several
cases,5 ° including McCray,5' the Court has pointed out that the
informer-hearsay was corroborated by the subsequent observations
of police officers. The most direct statement of the Court on the
issue of corroboration appears in Jones v. United States:
The question here is whether an affidavit which sets out personal
observations relating to the existence of cause to search is to be
deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact that it sets out not the

affiant's observations but those of another. An affidavit is not to
be deemed insufficient on that score, so long as a substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay is presented.

In testing the sufficiency of probable cause for an officer's
action even without a warrant, we have held that he may rely upon
information received through an informant, rather than upon his
direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge.
What we have ruled in the case of an officer who acts without
a warrant governs our decision here. If an officer may act upon
probable cause without a warrant when the only incriminating evidence in his possession is hearsay, it would be incongruous to hold
presented in an affidavit is insufficient basis for
that such 5evidence
2
a warrant.

In Jones the informant's hearsay was corroborated by his previous reliability, which was known to the affiant, the timeliness of
the informer's personal observation (the day before the warrant
issued), and the fact that the accused displayed needle marks on
his arm and was a known narcotics user, facts also personally known
to the affiant. This complex of corroborating factors was therefore
more than sufficient to supply the substantial basis for crediting the
informer's tips and for the Commissioner "to conclude that narcotics
were probably present in the apartment."5
It appears that the crucial factor necessary to sustain probable
cause predicated on informer-hearsay is not so much the corroboration of the tip by the officer's personal observations,54 but rather
50 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960) ; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

61In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the informer's tip was partially corroborated by Officer Jackson's spotting McCray, with whom he was familiar, in the
vicinity where the informer said he would be, and by the officer's observation of
McCray acting suspiciously immediately prior to his arrest.
52
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-70 (1960).
53Id. at 271.
54Where the informer's tip has stimulated investigation by the police which subsequently turns up evidence going beyond mere corroboration and showing probable
cause entirely apart from the tip, it has been held that inquiry into the identity of
the informer and the content and source of his tip is unwarranted and the informer
privilege remains absolute. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; United
States v. Elgisser, 334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964);
United States v. Santiago, 327 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Miller v. United States, 273

F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1959).
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the existence of any substantial basis for crediting the informer's
tip itself. This substantial basis may, but need not, be supplied by
personal observations of the officer. Thus, when the informer's tip
is supplemented by adequate proof of prior reliability, and there
is an absence of corroboration by independent observation, probable
cause is still established. 5 While prior reliability by itself is not
ordinarily as corroborative of the validity of the tip as the officer's
subsequent independent observations,"6 it nevertheless can justify
the officer in believing that the tip is probably trustworthy. This is
especially true in the case where the informer consistently gave correct information on numerous occasions in the past, the prior tips
always resulting in successful searches. However, where there is no
showing of independent observation, and prior reliability is the only
corroborative factor, the court should carefully scrutinize the evidence concerning the nature, frequency, and correctness of the prior
tips. Since in a warrantless search the burden of proving probable
cause should fall on the prosecution by clear and convincing evidence,5 7 a weak factual showing of prior reliability should result in
55 In United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1966), the court stated:

It is true that in the Jones case the informant's story was corroborated
by other sources of information, and in United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d
712, 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 850, 81 S.Ct. 95, 5 L.Ed.2d 74
(1960) it was suggested that "Jones may require that the affidavit include
some factual information independently corroborative of the hearsay report."
We believe, however, that United States v. Ventresca, supra, Aguilar v.
State of Texas, supra and Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct.
825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964), establish that such corroboration is not
required where the affiant attests to the previous reliability of the
informant.
See People v. Pitts, 26 111. 2d 395, 186 N.E.2d 357 (1962).
56 In United States v. Irby, 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962),
the informer was shown to have a history of mental illness and was of unstable
credibility - a pathological liar - and yet the court held probable cause to be established, since the information furnished was corroborated by police investigation prior
to the arrest.
57 "But when the constitutional validity of that arrest was challenged, it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to show with considerably more specificity than was shown in
this case what the informer actually said, and why the officer thought the information was credible." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
The federal courts have imposed the burden of proving probable cause on the
government in the case of a warrantless search and seizure. United States v. Elgisser,
334 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1964); Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1964); United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963); Plazola v. United
States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1959). Notwithstanding the wording quoted from Beck v. Ohio, "[tlhe
Supreme Court has never been squarely confronted with the question of which party
has the burden of proof on a motion to suppress for lack of probable cause." Note,
Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, in Student Symposium: The Fourth Amendment, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 502, 527 (1964) (emphasis added). It thus appears that the
federal approach is not constitutionally binding on the states. Indeed, ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 114-12(b)(1965) states that "the burden of proving that the search and
seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant." In People v. Rodriquez, 79 Ill.
App. 2d 26, 223 N.E.2d 414 (1967), a case of a warrantless search, the defendant
was held to have the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful.
See LaFave, supra note 5, at 346-49. It is suggested that the federal approach is more
equitable, since the principal reason for imposing upon the prosecution in a warrantless search the burden of establishing probable cause is that the prosecution, rather
than the defendant, is in a better position to know the existence of facts within the
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suppression. In the case of a search pursuant to warrant, where
the search is considered presumptively valid and the burden of
establishing an unlawful search and seizure is on the accused,5
prior reliability should be factually demonstrated in the affidavit,
rule 41(e) expressly providing that "a warrant shall issue only on
affidavit." 9
In summary, if the informer's tip is timely, is based on personal knowledge, and contains sufficient factual content concerning
a criminal offense, then either independent observation by the police
or proof of prior reliability of the informer would elevate the tip
to the dignity of probable cause. However, in the absence of such
substantial basis for crediting the informer's tip, the tip alone
is not sufficient to establish probable cause. 0
III.

THE INFORMER PRIVILEGE AND DISCLOSURE

A. Disclosure and the WarrantlessSearch
1. The Informer Privilege and the Sixth Amendment
As previously pointed out, if a reliable informer gives a tip
grounded upon timely and personal knowledge to the police, then
probable cause exists. McCray claimed, however, that even though
the officers' sworn testimony fully supported a finding of probable
cause for the arrest and search, nevertheless, the state court violated
the sixth amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination,
as applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment, when
it sustained the objection to the defendant's request for the informer's identity. 6 The Supreme Court viewed this claim as frivolous
and characterized it as "absolutely devoid of merit." 2
officer's mind immediately prior to the arrest and search. Another reason is that such
a search is an exception to the constitutional corollary that a search should rest upon
a warrant. "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes .... Only where incident to a
valid arrest ... or in 'exceptional circumstances' may an exemption lie, and then the
burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it .... " United States
v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482
(1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
58
E.g., Irby v. United States, 314 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Chin Kay v. United
States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75 (5th Cir.
1951).
59 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41'(c).
60

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), illustrates the importance which the Court
attaches to prior reliability. Although there was some corroboration of the tip by
independent observation, it was not extensive enough to constitute a substantial basis
for crediting the tip. The substantial basis of accreditation was furnished by the
rather impressive evidence of prior reliability. Without this proof of prior reliability
in McCray, it is submitted that probable cause would not have been established.
61
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967).
62 Id. at 314.
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The right of cross-examination "is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."63 Yet, that sixth amendment right has not, at this
point of constitutional development, been extended to proceedings
at all of the pre-trial stages. During the past several years, however,
the Supreme Court has extended other constitutional safeguards
into the pre-trial stages of the criminal process in order to prevent
the right to a fair trial from becoming illusory by sanctioning the
state's gathering of evidence in derogation of constitutional rights.
Just recently, the Court imposed stringent requirements upon law
enforcement officials at the interrogation64 and lineup6" phases of
the criminal process. The Court recognized that without the right
to counsel at the lineup, the defendant "is deprived of that right
of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to
confront the witnesses against him."6 6
A hearing on a motion to suppress evidence arising out of a
warrantless search, particularly in the case of a possessory crime,
is frequently the most critical stage of the proceedings for the
accused. In many instances, the issue of guilt will depend entirely
upon the resolution of the motion to suppress. If the exclusionary
rule is not to degenerate into an insubstantial device for the protection of fourth amendment rights, then it would seem that the full
panoply of rights incidental to cross-examination should be accorded
the defendant at the suppression hearing arising out of a warrantless search. In such a case there has been no prior judicial determination of probable cause, and the hearing on the motion to suppress
is really a post-factum judicial inquiry into the arresting officer's
state of mind immediately prior to the arrest and search. It is not
suggested here that the sixth amendment should require that the
informer himself must confront the accused and testify to his tip
to the police in order for the prosecution to establish a prima facie
case of probable cause. Hearsay has long been recognized as competent evidence for the establishment of probable cause, 7 and a
rule requiring the prosecution to establish informer-probable cause
through the testimony of the informer himself would impose heavy
63Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
65
1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Miranda and Wade cases have, in
effect, been overruled in the federal courts by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, title II, § 701, 82 Stat. 197.
66 388 U.S. at 235.
(warrant); Jones v. United
67 E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (warrant); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959) (no warrant).
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burdens on law enforcement. Rather, where probable cause is dependent on the informer's tip and the officer testifies to the tip and
establishes a prima facie case of probable cause, it is suggested that
the sixth amendment should, contrary to McCray, then come into
play and permit the accused to cross-examine the officer concerning
the informer's identity. For in the event that the officer is unable
to name the informer, there would be serious, if not total, doubt
cast on the officer's testimony concerning the informer's tip and
reliability. 8 On the other hand, if the court, in order to protect the
accused's sixth amendment rights, should order the officer to identify
the informer, then the accused would be afforded an opportunity to
subpoena the informer and perhaps contradict the prosecution's
evidence of probable cause.
The Court's answer to McCray's claim of a sixth amendment
deprivation of the right of cross-examination was that "it would
follow from this argument that no witness on cross-examination
could ever constitutionally assert a testimonial privilege, including
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination .... .69
The
Court's conclusion, however, falsely assumes that all privileges are
of equal dignity. Most privileges, including the informer privilege,
are generally creatures of statute or judicial rule, and have been strictly
construed because they are in derogation of the common law policy
of full disclosure of all relevant facts in the interest of truth.70 The
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is of a totally
different nature and is not strictly construed. 7 ' Thus, a witness should
be able to successfully invoke the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination vis-a-vis the accused's constitutional right of crossexamination because the witness' constitutional privilege is of an
origin and dignity equal to that of the accused's right of crossexamination.7 2 However, it does not follow from this that a witness
should be able to successfully invoke a statutory or evidential privilege vis-a-vis the accused's constitutional right of cross-examination.
In dealing with the informer privilege, the Court failed to recognize
68 Recently in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), the Supreme Court found a

denial of the sixth amendment right of cross-examination when a witness to whom
the accused allegedly sold heroin, refused to reveal his name and address on crossexamination during trial. The Court noted that "[p]rejudice ensues from a denial
of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of
his testimony and his credibility to a test . ...
"
69
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967).
708 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
71
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
72See, United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2nd Cir. 1963).
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a hierarchy of interrelated privileges and rights within the witnessaccused complex.78
Although the Supreme Court has voiced strong preference for
police resort to arrest and search warrants, 74 the net effect of the
Court's ruling in McCray on the sixth amendment issue might well
be the encouragement of warrantless arrests and searches.7 5 By
insulating the informer's identity from the light of cross-examination, the accused in most instances will be precluded from raising
any substantial questions of fact concerning the existence of probable cause. Whether the police will utilize the informer privilege
to elevate mere suspicion to the level of probable cause on the basis
of a productive search, and thereby take it upon themselves to
become the arbiters of probable cause, as envisioned by Mr. Justice
Douglas in his dissent,7 6 remains to be seen.
2. The Informer Privilege and the Fourteenth Amendment
Having found no sixth amendment violation in McCray, the
Court then considered whether the Illinois rule of informer privilege
offended those fundamental principles of justice and fairness inherent in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.77
The due process claim was viewed by the Court as a request by the
8
accused for the creation of a judicial presumption of police perjury.7
The Court concluded that to accept such a contention would constitute " 'a wholly unjustifiable encroachment . . . upon the constitutional power of states to promulgate their own rules of evidence . . . in their own state courts .... ..
This conclusion, however, follows only if it is assumed that there is a reasonable relationship between the conditions for the sustainment of the privilege
and the constitutional prohibition against an unreasonable search
and seizure. It has been stated that the "Court's treatment of . . .
[the] fourteenth amendment claim as a request for the presumption
of police perjury seems inconsistent with its past implicit recogni73 Recently the Court demonstrated marked sensitivity in subordinating the confiden-

tiality generally accorded to grand jury testimony to the paramount right of the
accused to obtain all information helpful to his defense. In Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966), the Court held that the prosecution was duty bound to
produce for defendant's examination the grand jury testimony of government witnesses, thereby abrogating the long established policy of secrecy surrounding grand
jury proceedings in federal courts. The Court noted the "growing realization that
disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the
proper administration of criminal justice."
74 Ventresca v. United States, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960).
75
See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 112, 196-200 (1967).
76
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 314 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
77E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
78
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1967).
79 Id. at 313.
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tion of danger inherent in requiring a defendant to accept the uncorroborated word of an arresting officer."'8 0
In the course of its disposition of the due process claim, the
Court went to some length to relegate to an evidentiary, as opposed
to a constitutional, rule the often cited language in Roviaro v. United
States"x that the invocation of the privilege is limited by fundamental principles of fairness. The McCray opinion disinherits
Roviaro of constitutional heritage by characterizing as dictum its
discussion of the limitations on the informer privilege in the context of search or seizure.8 Of course, once the right to disclosure
was stripped of its constitutional underpinnings implied in Roviaro,
then indeed the Court was compelled to hold that there was no
constitutional basis for imposing an absolute rule of disclosure in
cases of a warrantless search predicated upon an informer's tip.
The net effect of the Court's rejection of McCray's constitutional claims and the relegation of Roviaro to an evidentiary status
is to leave the states a freer hand in formulating their own rules of
informer privilege. In fact, the Court in McCray hinged its decision
on Illinois' evidentiary rule as outlined in judicial decisions, which
precluded disclosure of the informer's identity where "the trial judge
is convinced, by evidence submitted in open court and subject to
cross-examination, that the officers did rely in good faith upon
credible information supplied by a reliable informant." 3
The difficult problem, unanswered by McCray, remains: to
what minimal extent must procedural safeguards be afforded the
8

OThe Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 112, 198 (1967). For a practical
criticism of the Court's reasoning at this point in the McCray decision, pointing out
that police "perjury" is fact and not fiction, see Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204
THE NATION 596-97 (1967).
81 353 U.S. 53 (1957). See text accompanying note 27, supra.
82 Prior to McCray, Roviaro was generally viewed as a constitutional decision applicable
to the states under the fourteenth amendment. For Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), made the fourth amendment applicable to the states, and Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963), held that the constitutional standards of reasonableness under
the fourth amendment are applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment.
Roviaro involved the actions of federal officers in a federal prosecution. The statement in Roviaro that the informer privilege is limited by fundamental principles of
fairness and must give way when essential to a fair determination of the cause
would be applicable to the states so long as Roviaro was a constitutional decision.
Several courts, prior to McCray, seemed to impute to Roviaro a constitutional basis.
See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1962) ; United States ex
rel. Coffey v. Fay, 234 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Priestly v. Superior Court,
50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958). Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in
McCray viewed Roviaro as a constitutional decision:
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61, we held that where a
search without a warrant is made on the basis of communications of an
informer and the Government claims the police had "probable cause," disclosure of the identity of the informant is normally required. In no other
way can the defense show an absence of "probable cause." By reason of
Mapp v. Ohio .. . that rule is now applicable to the States.
386 U.S. at 315.
See 46 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 468 (1958) ; 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 477, 479 (1967).
83
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967).
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aggrieved before the privilege can be sustained? For instance, if a
statute or judicial rule of evidence sanctioned an absolute or unconditional privilege, that is, the sustainment of the privilege without the necessity of an evidentiary showing by the prosecution of
any such factor as conditioned the Illinois rule of privilege (such
as the officer's credibility), then the police would indeed become
the absolute arbiters of probable cause and the person aggrieved by
the search would be virtually deprived of his day in court on his
fourth amendment rights.84 For these reasons fundamental principles
of fairness and due process should come into play in such a situation
and abrogate the privilege. McCray seems to imply that an unconditional privilege would run afoul of minimal constitutional protections; for in sustaining the invocation of the privilege the Court
emphasized the substantial factual showing, in open court, of those
factors necessary to the proper invocation of the privilege in Illinois:
The arresting officers in this case testified, in open court, fully
and in precise detail as to what the informer told them and as to
why they had reason to believe his information was trustworthy.
Each officer was under oath. Each was subjected to searching crossexamination. The judge was obviously satisfied that each was telling
the truth, and for this reason he exercised the discretion conferred
upon him85by the established law of Illinois to respect the informer's
privilege.
Yet, in regard to the minimal procedural safeguards necessary
for the invocation of the informer privilege, the line of demarcation
between the state's right to promulgate its own rules of evidence
and the accused's rights inherent in due process and fundamental
In McCray, the Court did allude to a California statute, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1042(c)
(West 1966), vesting discretion in the trial judge to uphold the privilege upon an
evidentiary showing "in open court . . . that such information was received from a
reliable informant . . " The Court cited the California act as an example of a statute
consistent with the evidentiary rule of Illinois. But, since the California statute
makes no provision for an evidentiary showing of "good faith reliance" by the police
officer or credibility of the informant, as to the tip at issue, as required in Illinois,
it arguably falls short of the procedural safeguards present in McCray. One can conceive of situations where the prosecution might be able to establish the informer's
prior reliability, but the officer's testimony as to the particular tip in question may
be a complete fabrication; or, the informer, though shown to have been previously
reliable, may have lied to the police officer, who accepted the information as true,
made a warrantless search, and actually discovered contraband. In both of these
situations, it would seem that disclosure of the informer's identity would be required
in Illinois but not in California. The only safeguard in both rules is the broad discretion of the trial judge. If McCray, therefore, postulates as a condition of constitutional
immunity the procedural and evidential framework present in the Illinois rule of
informer privilege, then a California-type rule would be constitutionally infirm.
The California statute was enacted to nullify the effect of the holding of the
California Supreme Court in Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39
(1958). See text accompanying note 30 supra. The constitutionality of the statute
has recently been upheld in Martin v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 351, 353, 424
P.2d 935, 937 (1967), the court stating that the Supreme Court's ruling in McCray
was "controlling on the facts before us." The extent of the evidentiary finding in
Martin of the police officer's credibility, if indeed there was any such finding, is not
apparent from the opinion. The Court in Martin appears to assume that the Illinois
rule is no different from the California statute.
85 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967).
84

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

fairness remains distinctly clouded. It is submitted that, even though
the Supreme Court in McCray chose not to abrogate the informer
privilege on sixth amendment grounds, nevertheless the Court should
at least have delineated explicitly the minimal constitutional standards necessary for the invocation of the privilege, rather than merely
implying that an unconditional privilege would be constitutionally
infirm. Without such delineation, it can be anticipated that state
and federal opinions in this area will continue to fall into the morass
of confusion.
3. The Conditions for Disclosure of the Informer's Identity in
the Warrantless Search
Under McCray, the disclosure of an informer's identity is not a
matter of constitutional right. On the other hand, the judicial determination of whether or not to compel disclosure is not a matter
resting exclusively within the unfettered discretion of the trial court.
The real problem of the McCray case concerns the circumstances
under which disclosure should be ordered. In sustaining the trial
judge's exercise of discretion in upholding the claim of informer
privilege by the state, the Supreme Court predicated its ruling on
Illinois' evidentiary rule that the identity of the informer need not
be disclosed "if the trial judge is convinced, by evidence submitted
in open court and subject to cross-examination, that the officers did
rely in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable
informant."8 6 At first glance, the Court would appear to be stating
that the factors of good faith reliance by police officers, credibility
of informer-information, and informer reliability are pertinent to
a resolution of the issue of disclosure. However, as indicated previously, credibility of the tip and informer reliability are factors
essential to the issue of probable cause. Absent a proper showing of
such factors, probable cause is lacking and the evidence should be
suppressed. The problem of whether the prosecution should be
ordered to disclose the informer's identity or suffer the suppression
of evidence if it elects to disobey the order should never arise in
such a case, since the problem of disclosure presupposes a prima
facie showing of probable cause and a demand for disclosure by the
accused after a prima facie case has been established. What seems
to be crucial to the problem of disclosure, therefore, is the good faith
or credibility of the police officer in testifying to the facts underlying
the search. For instance, if the officer's testimony is vague, inconsistent, or otherwise questionable on the facts and circumstances
relating to the arrest and search, the informer's tip, or informer re8

Id. at 305.
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liability, or if the officer obviously testifies falsely to a particular
fact in issue, disclosure of the informer's identity might be ordered.
The Court in McCray intimated the propriety of disclosure in such
circumstances when it stated:
If the magistrate doubts the credibility of the affiant, he may require
that the informant be identified or even produced. It seems to us
that the same approach is equally sufficient where the search was
without a warrant, that is to say, that it should rest entirely with the
judge who hears the motion to suppress to decide whether he needs
such disclosure as to the informant
in order to decide whether the
87
officer is a believable witness.
Where the officer's credibility is thus put in issue, it is reasonable
to order disclosure in order to afford the accused the opportunity of
testing, among other things, whether in fact the informer exists,
what precisely he told the officers, and under what circumstances the
tip was given. If the officer is unable to name the informer, or
if the prosecution discloses the identity of the informer and the
informer contradicts the officer's testimony concerning the tip, there
would be serious, if not total, doubt cast on the officer's testimony
concerning probable cause. In short, with disclosure in the case
where the officer's credibility is suspect, the aggrieved is afforded
an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing consistent with the
exclusionary rule.sS
The prosecution, upon an order of disclosure, can of course
elect to withhold the identity of the informers" but not at the expense of the accused's fourth amendment rights. Upon an order of
disclosure and the prosecution's election to withhold the informer's
identity, the court should suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the search and seizure in issue.90 When the prosecution elects to
obey the order and disclose the informer's identity, it must provide
the accused with sufficient information - such as name, last known
address, and physical description of the informant -to enable the
accused to locate him."' If, after a diligent search, the accused is
unable to locate and compel the presence of the informer in court,
87 McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1967), quoting Chief Justice Weintraub's
discussion of the disclosure issue in State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 388, 201 A.2d 39,
45 (1964).
88 See Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal
Courts, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 851 (1965).
89 United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1967).
90

E.g., Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958); People v.
Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 2d 728, 341 P.2d 54 (1959) ; Drouin v. State, 222 Md.
271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960).

918 J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton

rev. 1961); People v. Diaz, 174

Cal. App. 2d 799, 345 P.2d 370 (1959) ; People v. Mays, 174 Cal. App. 2d 465, 344
P.2d 840 (1959) ; People v. Taylor, 159 Cal. App. 2d 752, 324 P.2d 715 (1958).
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then the court should grant the motion to suppress, since by virtue of
the order of disclosure, the court obviously has not been clearly convinced by the prosecution's evidence of the constitutional propriety
of the search and seizure. 2 There is the further consideration, rooted
in fundamental fairness, that the unavailability of the informer
under these circumstances has precluded the accused from a full
evidentiary hearing on his fourth amendment claim.
Disclosure of the informer's identity not being a matter of
constitutional right under McCray, a court could adopt an alternative
procedure to an order of disclosure in open court: when a demand
for disclosure is made by the accused and the court is not convinced
of the officer's credibility, and sufficient corroborative or independent evidence is lacking, the court could order that the informer be
produced in the privacy of the court's chambers, and in the absence
of counsel, accused, and witnesses, the court could conduct an in
camera hearing into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
alleged tip, the informer's prior reliability, and the contents of the
alleged tip. A record of the in camera proceedings could be kept
and sealed with the court for purposes of appellate review of its
final determination of the disclosure and suppression issues. Although such procedure has been utilized by at least one court,93 it
would appear that the alleged advantage in not jeopardizing the
future use of the informer by revealing his identity to the accused
might be overbalanced by the deprivation to the accused of a detailed
cross-examination of the officer with reference to the informer's
identity, and the further deprivation of an examination of the
informer with reference to probable cause and the officer's credibility. Although such deprivations would not amount to sixth amendment violations under McCray, the shortcomings of such procedure
should not be minimized, particularly since an in camera hearing
would be a procedure resulting from some initial reservations by
the court of the officer's credibility.
In summary, when the issue of disclosure is raised, unless the
court is convinced of the officer's credibility, disclosure of the informer's identity should be ordered. What must not be forgotten
is that in the absence of disclosure the accused is severely hampered
92 See cases cited note 57 supra.
93
United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1967). In LaFave, supra note 5, at 368,
it is noted that this practice is being encouraged by some trial judges in Illinois. Yet,
in People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966), after defendant was
denied the name of the informer, his request for such an in camera hearing was also
denied, and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judge's decision, apparently
on the basis that the police officers' testimony was sufficiently credible to establish
probable cause.
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in, if not precluded from, effectively litigating his fourth amendment
right. Unless the law of informer privilege is cautiously applied,
there is danger that the exclusionary rule will be reduced to a nullity.
B. Disclosure and the Search Pursuantto Warrant
The fundamental problem in the search pursuant to warrant
is whether the aggrieved is ever entitled to the disclosure of the
identity of the informer referred to in the affidavit. The question
was at least implicitly before the Supreme Court in Rugendorf v.
United States,94 and the Court was able to sidestep a direct confrontation of the problem. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion
for the names of the informers referred to in the affidavit, on the
basis of which a search warrant was issued, and he challenged not
only the legal sufficiency of the affidavit but also its veracity. The
motion was denied. The Supreme Court held that the search was
valid because the alleged factual inaccuracies of the affidavit were
"of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, and,
not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go
to the integrity of the affidavit."9 5 The Court then concluded that
since there was substantial basis for crediting the informer-hearsay
declarations in the affidavit, the informer's identity was properly
withheld, challenge to the veracity of the affidavit having failed to
show that "the affiant was in bad faith or that he made any misrepresentations to the Commissioner in securing the warrant.' 9 6 Nevertheless, the Court seems to have implied that if an affidavit does set forth
allegations of an informer's communication which include matters
within the personal knowledge of the affiant and essential to probable cause, disclosure might be compelled upon a preliminary showing by the aggrieved that the affiant acted in bad faith or made
misrepresentations in obtaining the warrant. But, the defendant
should support his motion to disclose with something more than mere
97
suspicion that the facts of the affidavit are untrue.
The Ccurt's approach in Rugendorf is strikingly similar to the
approach in McCray with reference to good faith and credibility.
From the standpoint of the aggrieved, however, the Rugendorf ruling
is of little comfort, since in most cases it will be virtually impossible
to show that the affiant acted in bad faith or misrepresented the
informer's allegations to the judge or commissioner, unless testimony
9376 U.S. 528 (1964).
95

Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
9
7 United States v. Warrington, 17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
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from the informer himself is obtained. 8 However, assuming that
the aggrieved can establish a prima facie case of bad faith or misrepresentation by the affiant, disclosure seems to be in order, since
otherwise there is great danger not only that the constitutional requirement of an oath or affirmation for a warrant is being abused,9 9
but also that the judicial procedure for the issuance of a warrant, as
well as the search and seizure process itself, is being utilized by the
affiant to perpetrate a sham upon the aggrieved and the court;1" 0
disclosure therefore will preserve the constitutional mandate from
invidious abuse, and protect the court and the aggrieved from fraud.
In order to preserve strict constitutional adherence to the fourth
amendment by law enforcement officials, a vigorous argument can
be proffered that a person aggrieved by a search and seizure pursuant to warrant should be entitled to disclosure of the informer's
identity under the same circumstances as in a warrantless search,
even in the absence of a showing of bad faith or misrepresentation
on the part of the affiant, in order to contest via an evidentiary
hearing the underlying allegations of the affidavit. Otherwise, by
simply reciting the magical phraseology of informer-probable cause
in the affidavit, law enforcement officials might be able to effectively
foreclose the aggrieved from his day in court on probable cause.
Under federal rule 41(c), no testimony is taken upon the issuance
of a search warrant, the rule providing that the warrant shall issue
only on affidavit.1" 1 At first glance, it does not seem unreasonable
to urge that one aggrieved by a search pursuant to warrant should
be afforded the same procedural remedy as one aggrieved by a
warrantless search. In the latter case, the party aggrieved is afforded
the opportunity of contesting the sworn testimony of law enforce98 If, however, the informer initially contacts an officer and the officer in turn communicates the informer's message to the affiant, the aggrieved might conceivably be
able to show through the testimony of the initial contact that the statement in the
affidavit, allegedly recounting the informer's message to the initial contact and its
relay by the initial contact to the affiant, is false, and thereby establish a prima facie
case of bad faith or misrepresentation by the affiant. On the other hand, if the
affidavit sets forth probable cause independently of the informer's tip to the initial
contact, and the independent probable cause is not shown by the aggrieved to be
the product of misrepresentation or bad faith, then the informer's tip, even though
misrepresented in bad faith by the affiant, is not really essential to probable cause
at all. The difficult case on disclosure, within the context of "bad faith-misrepresentation," appears to be the case involving a communication from the informer to the
police with little or no other evidence of probable cause existing. In such a situation if
the aggrieved can establish a prima facie case of bad faith or misrepresentation by
the affiant, disclosure seems to be in order under Rugendorf. See United States v.
Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960).
9

9 U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
00 See King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
101 FED. R. GRIM. P. 41(c).
1
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ment officials by an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress,
and might under some circumstances demand disclosure. Why
should not a party aggrieved by a search pursuant to warrant be
accorded the same opportunities?
Several cases have held that in the case of a search pursuant
to warrant the aggrieved on a motion to suppress may attack the
factual accuracy or contents of an affidavit by an evidentiary hearing; 10 2 but these cases did not concern themselves with the right of
disclosure of the informer's identity as antecedent to the evidentiary
hearing. A few cases, however, have held that the aggrieved is entitled to disclosure of the identity of the informer referred to in an
affidavit and that, in the absence of such disclosure, the evidence
should be suppressed.' 13 Notwithstanding a vigorous argument and
a few cases to the contrary, it would appear that a rule permitting
the aggrieved to demand the disclosure of an informer's identity
in order to contest the allegations of the affidavit relating to the
informer's credibility and reliability is of doubtful judicial persuasion. In the absence of a showing of bad faith or misrepresentation by the affiant, to allow such disclosure is, in effect, to repudiate
the rule that in a search pursuant to warrant probable cause must
be determined by the affidavit itself, nothing more and nothing
less."' The reasons for confining the inquiry to the four corners of
the affidavit are manifold. In the first place, to afford the accused
the right to contest the veracity of the affidavit would undoubtedly
discourage resort to search warrants by law enforcement officials.
If the allegations of an affidavit are subject to contradiction and
impeachment to the same extent as the testimony of a law enforcement official on a motion to suppress involving a warrantless search.
the factors presently motivating the procurement of warrants
(rendering the officer's belief immune from evidentiary contradiction
and legally validating the officer's subsequent search and seizure
through prior independent judicial judgment) might be destroyed.
In the second place, if the aggrieved is granted the right to testimonially impeach the veracity of an otherwise sufficient affidavit,
E.g., United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966); King v. United
States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73 (D.
Del. 1964) ; Lerner v. United States, 151 A.2d 184 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1959) ; People
v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965).
103United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d
729 (Fla. App. 1963).
104 E.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Paldo v. United States,
55 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932); United States v. Freeman, 165 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.
Ind. 1958) ; United States v. Casino, 286 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
102
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should not the prosecuting attorney be given the right to rebut the
aggrieved's evidence? The net effect of such procedure might well
be to render nugatory the recognized implications in rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, both as to the legality of the
searching officer's actions and the prima facie validity of the judicial
officer's determination of probable cause. Finally, it should be
remembered that the warrant is issued by an independent judicial
officer and, contrary to the case of a warrantless search, his decision
on the issue of probable cause presumably entails a weighing of the
aggrieved's right of privacy. Moreover, if the magistrate doubts the
veracity of the allegations in the affidavit concerning the informer,
he can require the identification and production of the informer
prior to the issuance of a warrant. °5 Since a warrant is issued
only on the basis of an affidavit filed with the court,'0 6 a supplemental affidavit setting forth the additional facts and circumstances as
provided by the produced informer which confirm the veracity of
the tip could then be filed as a matter of record prior to the issuance
of the warrant. The aggrieved under such a procedure is not without
remedy; the basis of the judicial officer's action in issuing the warrant
is a matter of record and subject to contest by the aggrieved on a
hearing concerning the sufficiency, as opposed to the veracity, of
the affidavit.
So long as the procedure for issuance of warrants is not proven
to be frequently abused,' 0 7 it would seem that for the above reasons
a motion for disclosure in order to contest the credibility and reliability of the informer should have no place in the case of a search
pursuant to warrant. The only purpose of disclosure would be to
afford the aggrieved the opportunity to contest the veracity, as opposed to the sufficiency, of the affidavit, and fundamental principles
of policy seem to militate against opening up the affidavit to the
onslaught of factual contradiction and impeachment common to the
105 E.g., State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 201 A.2d 39, 45 (1964), quoted with approval
in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1967) ; People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d
714, 361 P.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1961).
106 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c), (f).
107 For an analysis of the warrant procurement procedure in practice, pointing out that
magistrates perfunctorily issue warrants requested by prosecutors, see Miller &
Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current
Practices, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1. See also LaFave & Remington, Controlling the
Police: The Judge's Role in Mlaking and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions,
63 MIcH. L. REv. 987, 991-95 (1965), pointing out that in many instances, judicial
control of the warrant process is only a "fiction."
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motion to suppress arising out of the warrantless search. 108 In the
case of bad faith or misrepresentation by the affiant, however, there
is present an essential abuse of the search and seizure process ab
initio, as well as a possible fraud upon the court, and the policy of
"affidavit-conclusiveness" should take second place to the only effective remedy calculated to preserve the integrity of the fourth
amendment and the judicial process.
CONCLUSION

The essence of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is the indefeasible right of personal
privacy in the individual. To protect this right the exclusionary rule
was adopted; to implement this rule the motion to suppress was
provided. True, the effect of the exclusionary rule might well be that
the criminal goes free, but "it is the law that sets him free," and
"[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than ... its disregard of the charter of its own existence."' 10 9
The net effect of McCray, however, is the subordination of
individual privacy to society's interest in effective law enforcement.
For by relegating to an evidentiary, as opposed to a constitutional,
status the demand of an accused for disclosure of the informer's
identity during cross-examination on the motion to suppress, the
Court has helped to insulate from cross-examination the very source
of ostensible probable cause; accordingly, the accused's day in court
on his fourth amendment rights has been drastically curtailed. Far
from discouraging abusive police practices, McCray can only encourage warrantless searches allegedly predicated on a tip from the
so-called previously reliable informer. Thus, the policeman becomes
108 In People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 722, 361 P.2d 587, 591, 12 Cal. Rptr. 859,
863 (1961), the court stated as follows:
If a search is made pursuant to a warrant valid on its face and the only
objection is that it was based on information given to a police officer by an
unnamed informant, there is substantial protection against unlawful search
and the necessity of applying the exclusionary rule in order to remove the
incentive to engage in unlawful searches is not present. The warrant, of
course, is issued by a magistrate, not by a police officer, and will be issued
only when the magistrate is satisfied by the supporting affidavit that there is
probable cause. He may, if he sees fit, require disclosure of the identity of the
informant before issuing the warrant or require that the informant be
brought to him. The requirement that an affidavit be presented to the
magistrate and his control over the issuance of the warrant diminish the
danger of illegal action, and it does not appear that there has been frequent
abuse of the search warrant procedure. One of the purposes of the adoption
of the exclusionary rule was to further the use of warrants, and it obviously
is not desirable to place unnecessary burdens upon their use. . . . It follows
from what we have said that where a search is made pursuant to warrant
valid on its face, the prosecution is not required to reveal the identity of
the informer in order to establish the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result of it.
10
9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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the arbiter of probable cause and the right of privacy is truly a right
without a remedy. Implicit in McCray is the threat that the constitutional right of privacy might be relegated to a status inferior to that
of a common law rule of institutional efficiency. A free society can
endure without an informer privilege, but hardly without a meaningful constitutional right of privacy.

